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Abstract
■ Via mental simulation, imagined events faithfully reproduce
the neural and behavioral activities that accompany their actual
occurrence. However, little is known about how fundamental
characteristics of mental imagery—notably perspectives of self—
shape neurocognitive processes. To address this issue, we used
fMRI to explore the impact that vantage point exerts on the neural
and behavioral correlates of imaginary sensory experiences (i.e.,
pain). Participants imagined painful scenarios from three distinct
visual perspectives: first-person self (1PS), third-person self (3PS),
and third-person other (3PO). Corroborating increased ratings of
pain and embodiment, 1PS (cf. 3PS) simulations elicited greater
activity in the right anterior insula, a brain area that supports inter-
oceptive and emotional awareness. Additionally, 1PS simulations
evoked greater activity in brain areas associated with visual im-
agery and the sense of body ownership. Interestingly, no dif-
ferences were observed between 3PS and 3PO imagery. Taken
together, these findings reveal the neural and behavioral cor-
relates of visual perspective during mental simulation. ■
INTRODUCTION
Imagination is a powerful tool. Not only does it facilitate
the contemplation of a world beyond the here-and-now,
it also has the ability to alter present reality (e.g., changing
current psychological and physiological states). Indeed,
figments of the imagination can provoke paralyzing fear,
irresistible temptation, or overwhelming joy. Through this
capacity to imagine events in a realistic manner, prospec-
tive experiences can be previewed (i.e., analyzed, evalu-
ated) and behavior can be optimized to meet the myriad
demands of daily living (Boyer, 2008; Gilbert & Wilson,
2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Wilson & Gilbert,
2003). To this end, people spend considerable amounts of
time simulating, rather than directly perceiving, the world
around them (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood &
Schooler, 2006). Guided by the combined influence of
semantic and episodic memory (Szpunar, 2010; Addis,
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter,
Addis, & Buckner, 2007), these mental simulations pro-
vide invaluable insight into the character and potential
consequences of yet-to-be experienced events.
Underlying the functional nature of mental simulations
are the overlapping neurocognitive operations that sup-
port both imagination and perception/action (Moulton &
Kosslyn, 2009; Kosslyn & Moulton, 2009; Kosslyn, Ganis, &
Thompson, 2006; Gallese, 2005; Fadiga & Craighero, 2004;
Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn, 2004; Grèzes & Decety, 2001;
Jeannerod, 2001; Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; Farah,
1989). For example, imagining an unpleasant ordeal—
such as root canal work at the dentist—can elicit physical
and psychological effects (e.g., elevated heart rate, pain,
anxiety) commensurate with the veridical event (i.e., men-
tal simulation is embodied; see Meier, Schnall, Schwartz,
& Bargh, 2012; Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Niedenthal,
Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Wilson,
2002; Barsalou, 1999; Arnold, 1984). According to this
viewpoint, mental simulation is enabled via sensorimotor
activity that evolved to support interaction with the en-
vironment (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007; Decety, 1996;
Jeannerod, 1994). Importantly, however, a robust body of
evidence suggests that the “target” (i.e., self vs. other) of
the simulation modulates the extent to which imaginary ex-
periences recruit the same neural mechanisms that support
veridical experience (Ochsner et al., 2008; Zaki, Ochsner,
Hanelin, Wager, & Mackey, 2007; Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff,
& Decety, 2006; Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Decety
& Jackson, 2004; Ochsner et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004).
When imagining another individualʼs experience, too
little overlap with the neural and cognitive activities that
support perception/action can impede social-cognitive
functions and undermine empathic accuracy (Uddin
et al., 2008; Decety & Jackson, 2006). At the same time,
however, neural and behavioral distinctions between tar-
gets are necessary to maintain a sense of agency as well
as the functional integrity of mental simulation (Decety
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& Jackson, 2006). As such, when participants imagine
themselves performing a simple action, there is greater
activity in the neural substrates that underlie actual per-
formance, compared with simulations of another person
(e.g., the experimenter) executing the same movements
(Ruby & Decety, 2001). Moreover, beyond straightforward
motor behavior, a number of experiments have shown
that the activation of brain regions implicated in sensory
perception is greater for self- compared with other simula-
tions (Jackson et al., 2005, 2006; Ruby & Decety, 2001).
In particular, the anterior insula (AI), an area of the brain
that is crucial to the awareness of subjective feeling states
(e.g., pain, thirst, arousal; see Zaki, Davis, & Ochsner, 2012;
Lamm & Singer, 2010; Craig, 2002, 2003, 2009; Critchley,
2004, 2005, 2009; Singer, Critchley, & Preuschoff, 2009;
Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004), is
preferentially recruited during self-simulations (Jackson
et al., 2006). Consistent with this pattern of activation,
assessments of the intensity of othersʼ experiences are
generally subdued compared with our own (e.g., my pain
is worse than your pain).
One possible explanation for these findings is that, being
body-centered and agentic, self-simulations recruit more
pronounced sensorimotor processes than comparable
other-person musings (Jackson et al., 2006). Evidence to
support this claim reveals that viewing actions from
a body-congruent perspective elicits greater activity in
the sensorimotor cortex compared with watching them
from an incongruent orientation (Jackson et al., 2006).
Elsewhere, investigations have indicated that agency and
body ownership rely heavily on sensorimotor inputs being
collated from a first-person frame of reference (Petkova,
Khoshnevis, & Ehrsson, 2011). When body-congruent
visual cues are in place, people have been shown to
take ownership over rubber hands and even feel vicari-
ously responsible for other peopleʼs actions (Costantini &
Haggard, 2007; Ehrsson, Spence, & Passingham, 2004;
Wegner, Sparrow, & Winerman, 2004; Pavani, Spence, &
Driver, 2000). Taken together, these findings suggest that
visuospatial information (e.g., body congruent vs. body in-
congruent) may be an important referent for distinguishing
between self and other (Decety & Jackson, 2006).
Curiously, however, in the mental world, the self can
be and, in fact quite commonly, is viewed from an out-
side point of view (Christian, Miles, Parkinson, & Macrae,
2013), with approximately 46% of individuals indicating
that a third-person perspective is their predominate mode
of imagery in everyday life. When adopting a third-person
(i.e., observer) perspective, people see themselves em-
bedded in an event, as if from an external viewpoint (Libby
& Eibach, 2011; Nigro & Neisser, 1983). In contrast, from
a first-person (i.e., actor) vantage point, people simulate
events through their own eyes, as if they are looking out-
ward on the environment. As Nigro and Neisser pointed
out when they originally identified the prevalence of first-
(i.e., field) and third-person (i.e., observer) perspectives
in episodic memory, these distinct vantage points empha-
size different aspects of an event during mental simulation.
Whereas first-person simulations contain more informa-
tion pertaining to bodily sensations, affective reactions,
and psychological states (e.g., Holmes & Mathews, 2010;
McIsaac & Eich, 2002, 2004; Nigro & Neisser, 1983), third-
person simulations tend to focus on the overarching pur-
pose of an action and lack specific experiential details (Libby
& Eibach, 2011). In other words, at a behavioral level, first-
person simulations are more embodied than their third-
person counterparts (Miles, Christian, Masilamani, Volpi, &
Macrae, 2014; Macrae, Sunder Raj, Best, Christian, & Miles,
2013). Evidence for distinct neural mechanisms that underlie
the retrieval of everyday autobiographical events (e.g., mak-
ing a sandwich, following a map) from a first-person versus a
third-person point of view (Eich, Nelson, Leghari, & Handy,
2009) substantiates this claim. When it comes to previewing
imaginary sensory experiences (e.g., pain), however, the
neural mechanisms that support these modes of simulation
have yet to be investigated.1
Current Research
To identify the neural operations that accompany hypo-
thetical self-simulations generated from first- and third-
person points of view, the current experiment used fMRI
to measure the BOLD response to imaginary sensory
experiences across three distinct visual perspectives: first-
person self (1PS), third-person self (3PS), and third-person
other (3PO). In recent years, many studies exploring
(BOLD) responses to imaginary painful experiences have
yielded activity in regions of the putative pain matrix
(Derbyshire, 2000) and corroborated the role of the AI
as a key component of interoceptive awareness (Van der
Heiden, Scherpiet, Konicar, Birbaumer, & Veit, 2013;
Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011; Singer & Lamm, 2009; Hein
& Singer, 2008; Ochsner et al., 2008; Zaki et al., 2007;
de Vignemont & Singer, 2006; Jackson et al., 2005, 2006;
Lawrence et al., 2006). For this reason, simulated pain
was utilized here as a vehicle to investigate the impact of
vantage point on the patterns of BOLD responses elicited
by imagined sensory experiences.
Given that no previous neuroimaging studies have con-
sidered imagining hypothetical sensory experiences from
a 3PS perspective, the current design enabled two pre-
viously unexplored contrasts to be undertaken: (i) 1PS
versus 3PS to determine the role of body-centered versus
non-body-centered self-relevant imagery and (ii) 3PS versus
3PO to investigate potential differences between self- and
other simulations when both are visualized from a third-
person frame of reference. Guided by the growing body
of evidence, which posits that self-simulations from a
first-person perspective are imbued with more experiential
content than the third-person equivalents (Macrae et al.,
2013, 2014; Miles et al., 2014; Eich et al., 2009; McIsaac
& Eich, 2002, 2004; Nigro & Neisser, 1983), we expected
recruitment of neural areas that support interoceptive
awareness (e.g., AI) to be greater when sensory experi-
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ences were imagined from a 1PS than 3PS perspective.
Differences were also expected to emerge in other cortical
regions associated withmental simulation (Eich et al., 2009;
Moulton & Kosslyn, 2009). Specifically, temporal–parietal
regions implicated in body awareness and action repre-
sentation were anticipated to yield greater activity when
events were generated from a 1PS (cf. 3PS) vantage
point (e.g., Tsakiris, 2010; Blanke et al., 2005; Decety &
Sommerville, 2003; Blanke, Ortigue, Landis, & Seeck,
2002; Chaminade & Decety, 2002; Farrer & Frith, 2002).
Considering the scarcity of work addressing self- versus
other imagery from a third-person perspective, we adopted
an exploratory approach when comparing these modes
of simulation. In keeping with previous work on self-
referential processing, however, one possibility is that dif-
ferences may emerge in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC)
as a function of the simulated target (i.e., 3PS > 3PO;
Wagner, Haxby, & Heatherton, 2012; Kelley et al., 2002).
METHODS
Participants and Design
Thirty-three right-handed adults (Mage = 19.7 years, SD=
2.8; 18 women) participated in the experiment in exchange
for $25 or course credit. All participants were fluent in
English and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They
reported the imagery perspective they most frequently
adopt and completed the Vividness of Visual Imagery Ques-
tionnaire (VVIQ; Marks, 1973) to ensure they were able
to generate sufficiently clear mental simulations to perform
the task.2 The study was reviewed and approved by
the Committee for the Protection of Human Subjects at
Dartmouth College and had a single factor (Visual Perspec-
tive: 1PS vs. 3PS vs. 3PO) repeated-measures design.
Materials and Procedure
Participants engaged in a series of guided mental imagery
tasks from three distinct visual perspectives (i.e., 1PS, 3PS,
3PO). Specifically, participants were instructed to imagine
everyday painful episodes (e.g., cut finger) that were (i)
happening to themselves and seen from a first-person
point of view (i.e., through their own eyes), (ii) happening
to themselves and seen from a third-person point of view
(i.e., as if they were seeing themselves from an external
viewpoint), and (iii) happening to an unfamiliar other per-
son and seen from a third-person point of view (i.e., akin
to how we would see someone else in pain in everyday
life).3 The materials were adapted from Jackson et al.
(2006) and before scanning the experimenter described
all aspects of the procedure (e.g., the three visual perspec-
tives) to ensure participantsʼ understanding of the task.
fMRI Design
Participants imagined 10 pain-eliciting scenarios from a
single perspective before moving on to another vantage
point. A block design was used to minimize switching
costs associated with changing perspective. All three per-
spectives were presented in each run (perspective order
counterbalanced across runs; run order counterbalanced
across participants), such that every run comprised
30 scenarios. There were three runs in total, thus each par-
ticipant imagined a total of 90 painful experiences. At the
beginning of each block, participants were shown a set of
instructions informing them which visual perspective (with
an accompanying description) they were to adopt for the
next 10 trials. On each trial, participants saw a short prompt
reminding them of the perspective they were required to
use for the upcoming scenario (e.g., first-self ), followed by
a brief description of the painful episode (e.g., stub toe
on door), which was displayed for 2500 msec before dis-
appearing to reveal a blank gray screen that remained for
5000 msec. Participants were instructed to imagine the
prompted scenario from the appropriate perspective as
clearly and vividly as possible during the blank screen. Fol-
lowing each trial, participants were required to give ratings
about their imagery experience. On a 5-point scale, they re-
sponded to how vivid (1 = not very vivid, 5 = very vivid)
and painful (1 = not very painful, 5 = very painful) they
imagined the experience to be (either for themselves
or the unfamiliar other). Given that participants received
the same instructions and performed the same rating
task on all trials within all blocks, linguistic and motoric
processing demands associated with making ratings were
matched between blocks corresponding to different imagery
conditions.
Postimaging Procedure
After the scanning session, participants reported the diffi-
culty they had experienced adopting each of the visual
perspectives (9-point scale: 1 = not difficult, 9 = very dif-
ficult) and filled out a detailed questionnaire (adapted
from Lenggenhager, Mouthon, & Blanke, 2009) that
assessed the level of disembodiment associated with each
vantage point. For example, participants were asked,
“How strong was the feeling that you were experiencing
the painful scenarios you imagined?” and “How strong
was the feeling that you were located at some distance
away from where the painful scenario was taking place?”
These questions tapped into how much participants felt
physically, as well as emotionally, distanced from pain in
the imagined scenario. Finally, participants were debriefed
and dismissed.
Imaging Acquisition and Analysis
Images were acquired using a Philips Intera Achieva 3-T
Scanner (Philips Medical Systems, Bothell, WA) with a
32-channel SENSE (SENSEitivity Encoding) head coil.
Stimuli were presented via a Panasonic DT-4000UI DLP
projector connected to a Macbook Pro laptop running
868 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 27, Number 5
SuperLab 4.0 (San Pedro, CA). Functional images in pain
imagery runs were collected using gradient-echo echo-
planar imaging (echo time/repetition time = 35/2500 msec;
voxel resolution = 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm; field of view =
240 mm × 240 mm; matrix size = 80 × 80) with forty-two
3-mm thick transverse slices (no gap) acquired in inter-
leaved order. Each functional run consisted of 269 dynamic
scans, giving a total scan duration of 110 2200 per run. A high-
resolution T1-weighted anatomical image was acquired
at the end of the scanning session (220 slices; echo time/
repetition time = 3.7/8200 msec; voxel resolution =
0.94 mm× 0.94 mm× 1.00 mm; field of view= 240mm×
188 mm; acquisition matrix size = 240 × 187; total
acquisition time= 3min and 7 sec).
Data were preprocessed and analyzed using AFNI (Cox,
1996). Extreme signal changes not attributable to physio-
logical phenomena were removed using the AFNI program
3dDespike. Slice timing correction was applied to each
volume to adjust for interleaved slice acquisition order.
To correct for head motion, each functional volume was
spatially aligned to the volume acquired closest in time
to the anatomical scan (i.e., to the final volume of the last
functional run), then aligned to the anatomical scan using
the AFNI program 3dvolreg. Data were spatially smoothed
with a Gaussian 6 mm FWHM kernel using the AFNI
program 3dmerge, and each voxel time series was scaled
to have a mean of 100. Before regression, consecutive
repetition time pairs where the Euclidean norm of the
motion derivative exceeded 1.0 were excluded from fur-
ther analysis.
The average voxel-wise hemodynamic response for
each imagery condition (1PS, 3PS, 3PO) was estimated
using the AFNI program 3dDeconvolve. Each imagery
block was modeled by a block function with 200-sec
duration. The six demeaned motion parameters obtained
from 3dvolreg were also included as predictors of no
interest, and data were detrended with a fourth-order
polynomial to account for signal changes because of scan-
ner drift and head motion. Each participantʼs anatomical
scan was skull-stripped and transformed to standard space
using the AFNI program @auto_tlrc, and the same trans-
form was used to align each participantʼs functional results
to standard space before group analysis. In order to restrict
analyses to cortex, a relatively liberal gray matter mask of
the TT_N27 brain was created using FMRIBʼs Automated
Segmentation Tool (Zhang, Brady, & Smith, 2001) in FSL
(Smith et al., 2004) and dilated using the 3dcalc function
in AFNI.
Dissociating the effects of vantage point and target iden-
tity on fMRI responses during mental simulations required
two key statistical contrasts. First, to probe for regions in
which activity was modulated by the visual perspective
adopted while imagining self, responses to 1PS and 3PS
were compared using the AFNI program 3dttest++. Cen-
tered difficulty ratings for each condition were included
as a covariate of no interest to control for any differences
in brain activity between the two conditions attributable
to task difficulty. Second, to probe for regions in which
activity was modulated by the identity of the imagined
target (i.e., self/other differences) in the absence of
differences in visual perspective, an analogous analysis
was undertaken to compare neural responses to 3PS
and 3PO. In order to integrate the current findings into
the extant perspective-taking literature, we also explored
differences between 1PS and 3PO imagery.
Correction for multiple comparisons was carried out
using 3dClustSim in AFNI, which implements Monte Carlo
simulations (n = 1000) to determine the combined voxel
intensity and cluster extent thresholds required to estab-
lish a family-wise false positive rate of 5%. The spatial
structure of the noise in each participantʼs data was esti-
mated by applying AFNIʼs 3dFWHMx function to each
participantʼs residuals following subtraction of the GLM-
fitted signal model from voxel-wise time series data. The
resultant spatial smoothness estimates were averaged
across participants and input into 3dClustSim along with
the data set mask used for analysis. The results of this pro-
cedure indicated that a voxel-wise threshold of p < .02
and a cluster extent threshold of eighty-seven 3 mm ×
3 mm × 3 mm voxels would provide a family-wise error
(FWE) rate of .05. All reported results are significant
according to these criteria (i.e., at an FWE-corrected
threshold of p < .05).
RESULTS
Behavioral Data
To explore the effects of vantage point on participantsʼ
behavioral data, ratings of pain, vividness, disembodi-
ment, and difficulty were each submitted to a single factor
(Visual Perspective: 1PS, 3PS, 3PO) repeated-measures
ANOVA.4 The results revealed an effect of visual perspec-
tive on ratings of pain, F(2, 64) = 7.31, p = .001, ηp
2 =
0.19 (see Figure 1A), vividness, F(2, 64) = 10.58, p <
.05, ηp
2 = 0.25 (see Figure 1B), disembodiment, F(1.61,
51.51) = 32.48, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.50 (see Figure 1C),
and difficulty, F(1.71, 54.62) = 21.88, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.41
(see Figure 1D). Post hoc t tests (Bonferroni-corrected)
revealed that imagined episodes were considered to be
more painful, t(32) = 2.70, p = .02, d = 0.30, and vivid,
t(32) = 4.41, p < .001, d = 0.61, when simulated from a
1PS compared with a 3PS perspective. In addition, mental
imagery was rated as less disembodied, t(32) = −7.18,
p < .001, d = 1.27, and easier to generate, t(32) = −8.14,
p < .001, d = 1.94, when imagined from a 1PS than 3PS
viewpoint. An identical pattern of results was seen when
comparing 1PS to 3PO for behavioral ratings of pain,
t(32) = 3.25, p < .01, d = 0.36, and vividness, t(32) =
3.60, p < .01, d = 0.44, (i.e., 1st > 3rd), as well as ratings
of disembodiment, t(32) =−5.51, p< .001, d= 1.18, and
difficulty, t(32)=−5.04,p< .001, d=1.28, (i.e., 3rd>1st).
No differences were observed between 3PS and 3PO on
any of the measures.
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Imaging Data
Large clusters in the right AI (91 voxels; center of mass
[CoM] = 33, 19, −15; peak coordinate = 20, 32, −16;
all coordinates reported in Talairach space) extending
into the inferior and middle frontal gyri, the right infe-
rior parietal lobe (IPL, 112 voxels; CoM = 51, −53, 33;
peak coordinate = 47, −68, 42) and left extrastriate cor-
tex (90 voxels; CoM −5, −90, 7; peak coordinate = −8,
−101, 12) were more active for 1PS than for 3PS imagery
after controlling for differences associated with the dif-
ficulty of the tasks (see Figure 2). A cluster in the right pre-
cuneus (72 voxels; CoM = 12,−77, 46; peak coordinate =
11, −83, 48) approached but did not meet the minimum
cluster extent (87 voxels) to survive the FWE-corrected
significance threshold. This test revealed no brain areas
Figure 1. Behavioral ratings
as a function of imagery
perspective (1PS, 3PS, 3PO).
A (pain) and B (vividness)
show ratings made inside
the scanner that were
collected on a 5-point scale.
C (disembodiment) and
D (difficulty) show ratings
made outside of the scanner
that were collected on a
9-point scale. (Errors bars
represent ±1 SEM ).
Figure 2. Clusters where 1PS > 3PS ( p < .05, FWE-corrected). From left to right: right AI (91 voxels; CoM = 33, 19, −15; peak coordinate = 20,
32, −16), right IPL (112 voxels; CoM = 51, −53, 33; peak coordinate = 47, −68, 42), and left extrastriate cortex (90 voxels; CoM −5, −90, 7;
peak coordinate = −8, −101, 12). Results are presented on the AFNI TT_N27 template brain.
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that were preferentially recruited for 3PS compared with
1PS imagery.
Comparing 3PS and 3PO perspectives yielded no clus-
ters that survived the FWE-corrected significance thresh-
old. A cluster in the ventral MPFC (cluster extent =
82 voxels; CoM = 3, 36, −16; peak coordinate = −5,
35, −22) was recruited more for 3PO than 3PS imagery
but did not reach the minimum cluster size (87 voxels) to
survive the FWE-corrected significance threshold. There
were no clusters, even at reduced thresholds, which were
more active for 3PS compared with 3PO imagery.
Interestingly, no significant differences were observed
in BOLD responses during 1PS and 3PO imagery. The
largest cluster at a voxel-wise threshold of p < .02 had
an extent of only 52 voxels and spanned the right pre-
cuneus and posterior- to mid-cingulate cortex (CoM =
1, −33, 43; peak coordinate = 2, −32, 45). A similar
right AI cluster to that observed in the 1PS versus 3PS
comparison also trended toward being recruited more
for 1PS than for 3PO imagery (CoM = 29, 7, −16; peak
coordinate = 29, 11, −22; 41 voxels) but again did not
reach the cluster extent threshold required to survive
FWE correction.5
DISCUSSION
The current experiment utilized fMRI to investigate the
effects of visual perspective on the neural and behavioral
responses that accompany imagined sensory experiences
(i.e., painful events). Focusing on a previously under-
explored but regularly occurring perspective in the mental
world (Christian et al., 2013; Sutin & Robins, 2010; Nigro
& Neisser, 1983), the underlying neural mechanisms that
support 3PS compared with 1PS and 3PO simulations were
considered. Whole-brain contrasts revealed that 1PS simu-
lations yielded greater activation than corresponding 3PS
simulations in the right AI, right IPL, and left extrastriate
cortex. In addition, 1PS simulations were considered to
be more painful, more vivid, less difficult, and less dis-
embodied than events imagined from a 3PS vantage point.
Interestingly, no neural or behavioral differences emerged
between 3PS and 3PO simulations.
Extending previous work on the vantage point differ-
ences that accompany self versus other imagery (Jackson
et al., 2005, 2006; Decety & Sommerville, 2003), the cur-
rent results help to elucidate the neural and behavioral
consequences of imagining self-relevant events from dif-
ferent viewpoints (see Lamm et al., 2011; Decety, 2010;
Singer & Lamm, 2009). Reflecting distinctions in the ex-
periential nature of egocentric simulations (Macrae et al.,
2013, 2014; Miles et al., 2014; Libby & Eibach, 2011), 1PS
simulations yielded greater activity in cortical regions asso-
ciated with interoceptive and emotional awareness (i.e.,
AI; Lamm et al., 2011; Decety, 2010; Craig, 2003, 2009;
Singer & Lamm, 2009), psychological distance, body owner-
ship (i.e., right IPL; Parkinson, Liu, & Wheatley, 2014;
Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Walsh, 2003), and visual im-
agery (i.e., extrastriate cortex; Kosslyn et al., 1996). Further-
more, 1PS accounts were judged to be more painful
and body-centered than their 3PS equivalents. What this
suggests is that self-relevance alone is not enough to give
rise to a fully embodied experience.
These findings corroborate and extend the work of Eich
and colleagues (2009), which identified neural mecha-
nisms that support autobiographical recall of everyday
actions viewed from either a first- or a third-person point
of view. Similar to the current findings, limbic structures
showed greater activation for first-person (cf. third-person)
self-memory retrieval. Additionally, Eich et al. (2009) found
that remembering in general (from either perspective) re-
cruited a network of cortical regions (i.e., prefrontal and
medial-temporal cortices, IPL, precuneus) more than
a basic visual search control task. Interestingly, in the
current study, the IPL and precuneus (although below
threshold) did distinguish between first- and third-person
imagery. Although speculative, an interesting question
for future research will be to investigate the relationship
between autobiographical memory and visual perspective
to determine whether or not episodic content plays a
more pronounced role in constructing hypothetical first-
person (cf. third-person) scenarios. It is possible that
imagining events less dependent upon interoception and
body awareness may reveal differences in the recruitment
of other brain areas associated with self-referential pro-
cessing, such as the MPFC (Wagner et al., 2012; Kelley
et al., 2002).
Vantage Point and Embodiment
Through reactivation of the neural mechanisms that un-
derlie veridical experience (e.g., Moulton & Kosslyn,
2009; Kosslyn et al., 2006; Fadiga & Craighero, 2004;
Ganis et al., 2004; Grèzes & Decety, 2001; Jeannerod,
2001), the imagination can elicit real-time physiological
and emotional responses similar to those that accompany
actual encounters (Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Niedenthal
et al., 2005; Barsalou, 1999). Consequently, mental simu-
lations are invaluable informants about what the future
might be like and the feelings it is likely to evoke (Boyer,
2008; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis,
2007; Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Considering the prevalence
of a 3PS perspective in everyday life (Christian et al., 2013;
Nigro & Neisser, 1983), the present findings have a num-
ber of potential implications. To this end, richly embodied
first-person imagery may be beneficial for certain forms
of decision-making (e.g., selecting an entrée from a
menu) that are reliant upon interoceptively rich simula-
tions. However, there are undoubtedly occasions when
physiological responses to mentally simulated events are
problematic. Imagining, for instance, a life-threatening
accident can leave a residue of negative affect long after
the simulation has ended (Kosslyn et al., 1996; Sutherland
& Harrell, 1986; Roberts & Weerts, 1982).
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Beyond instilling bad feelings, visceral responses to
imaginary events also have the potential to fuel the symp-
toms of a range of psychological disorders (e.g., anxiety,
social phobia, PTSD; see Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Hirsch,
Meynen, & Clark, 2004; Shin et al., 1997; Pitman, Orr,
Forgue, de Jong, & Claiborn, 1987). A growing body
of evidence has identified third-person self-imagery as
an effective strategy for minimizing the unwanted con-
sequences often associated with negatively tinged im-
aginary events (Kross, 2009; Williams & Moulds, 2008;
McIsaac & Eich, 2004). Informing the effectiveness of this
technique, the current work revealed that vantage point
modulates recruitment of brain areas (e.g., AI) involved
in interoception (Lamm et al., 2011; Singer & Lamm,
2009; Hein & Singer, 2008). Importantly, the human
insula appears to be functionally organized along a
posterior-to-anterior gradient. In contrast to the posterior
insula, the AI is thought to support the subjective aware-
ness of bodily states and emotions abstracted away from
objective, modality-specific sensory inputs (Craig, 2009).
During painful experiences, perceptions of intensity are
reflected in AI responses (Peltz et al., 2011) even before
stimulus onset (Ploner, Lee, Wiech, Bingel, & Tracey,
2010; Wiech et al., 2010), suggesting that the AI may inte-
grate information about salience into the subjective experi-
ence of pain. As such, preferential recruitment of the AI
during 1PS imagery provides one potential mechanism
by which 3PS simulations dull the awareness of sensory
information that generally accompanies unpleasant imag-
ined events.
Whereas comparable activity in the AI between 1PS
and 3PO simulations did not meet threshold levels in the
current study, previous research has demonstrated prefer-
ential recruitment of this and other canonical pain regions
when imagining self versus other (Jackson et al., 2006).
One potential reason for this inconsistency, aside from
the highly intangible nature of the current task, is that
in the present investigation each participant selected
their own “other” target,3 whereas former studies have
specifically dictated the “other” (e.g., the experimenter)
that is to be imagined (Jackson et al., 2006). As such, the
amount of variability in the 3PO condition here may be
clouding differences in neural activity. Additionally, it is
possible that individuals employ unique strategies when
estimating the imaginary pain of a more personal “other”
target. Although multiple approaches may ultimately con-
verge on similar behavioral ratings (e.g., my pain is worse
than your pain), they are likely to recruit distinct neural
components (Lamm et al., 2011; Lamm & Singer, 2010;
Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007). Future work will be neces-
sary to explore these possibilities and probe the reliability
of the subthreshold effects seen here. In so doing, it will
be possible to determine the underlying neural mecha-
nisms that support distinctions in behavioral assessments
between 1PS and various 3PO targets.
Interestingly, in the current study, third-person simula-
tions diminished pain ratings regardless of target (i.e., self
vs. other) and no neural or behavioral differences
distinguished between 3PS and 3PO simulations. Although
caution should be taken when interpreting the absence
of a significant difference, this pattern of results suggests
that, when the self was imagined from a third-person point
of view, it may have been represented in a manner com-
parable to that of simulating another person. Two strands
of research would suggest that this might indeed be the
case. First, as already noted, first-person simulations are
more embodied than their third-person counterparts
(Miles et al., 2014; Macrae et al., 2013; Kross, 2009; Lorey
et al., 2009). Second, when going about our daily activities,
body ownership, and the experience of self requires multi-
sensory integration from a first-person frame of reference
(e.g., Guterstam & Ehrsson, 2012; Petkova et al., 2011;
Tsakiris, 2010; Blanke & Metzinger, 2008). Thus, when
self-relevant episodes are imagined from a third-person
vantage point, the simulated version of “me” may be
stripped of the experiential components that produce
the corporeal feeling of self (see Mitchell, Schirmer, Ames,
& Gilbert, 2011). Of course, future research will be needed
to more directly consider the sense of self that accom-
panies 3PS simulations and to determine whether or
not imagining events that are more self-reflective or social
in nature reveals neural and behavioral distinctions be-
tween 3PS and 3PO that are not evident when simulating
visceral states.
Conclusion
Guided by the observation that imagining the self from an
outside point of view is a regular occurrence in the mental
world (Christian et al., 2013; Sutin & Robins, 2010; Nigro &
Neisser, 1983), the current study explored the underlying
neural mechanisms that support 3PS simulations. When
compared with 1PS, 3PS imagery reduced behavioral
appraisals of pain and embodiment and attenuated BOLD
responses in brain areas associated with monitoring sub-
jective feeling states as well as psychological distance and
body ownership. Further emphasizing the role of body-
centered simulations, the current study showed no neural
or behavioral distinctions between 3PS and 3PO imagery.
Future work will be required to determine if similar effects
emerge when simulating events with alternative content
and to probe the sense of self (or lack thereof ) that ac-
companies 3PS simulations. Taken together, the present
data demonstrated the role of vantage point as a critical
determinant of the underlying mechanisms that support
and the behavioral assessments that accompany imaginary
sensory experiences—even when they pertain exclusively
to the “self.”
Reprint requests should be sent to Brittany M. Christian, Booth
School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 S Woodlawn
Ave., Chicago, IL 60637, or via e-mail: brittany.christian@
chicagobooth.edu.
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Notes
1. See Kross, Davidson, Weber, and Ochsner (2009) for a
conceptually related study.
2. Scores on VVIQ (1 = perfectly clear, 5 = no image at all)
were M = 1.99, SD = 0.46. Sixteen participants reported adopt-
ing a first-person perspective more often than a third-person
perspective, whereas 17 reported the opposite pattern. With
the goal of attenuating systematic differences in task difficulty
between the two self-imagery conditions, we attempted to re-
cruit approximately equivalent numbers of participants who
reported naturally adopting first- and third-person perspectives
during everyday self-imagery.
3. For the 3PO perspective, participants were instructed to
think of a person who was their same gender and age, such as a
classmate or coworker that they could clearly visualize, but not
someone they knew well or would consider a good friend. This
condition was called “third-other” throughout the course of the
experiment and no instructions to adopt the other personʼs per-
spective, to empathize with them, or to put oneself in the other
personʼs shoes were given. Of course, participantsʼ natural ten-
dencies to empathize with others, residual confusion about the
task and idiosyncracies in the unfamiliar other they chose may
have made for greater variation in participantsʼ neural and behav-
ioral responses for the “third-other” condition, thus contributing
to the null findings.
4. Mauchlyʼs test indicated that the assumption of sphericity
had been violated for disembodiment ratings, χ2(2) = 10.77,
p = .005, and difficulty ratings, χ2(2) = 7.94, p = .019 (ε =
.81 and ε = .85 respectively); therefore, Huynh–Feldt corrected
values are reported for these analyses.
5. In response to reviewersʼ comments, we also compared fMRI
responses elicited by the 3PO imagery condition to those elicited
by self-imagery, averaged across 1PS and 3PS imagery conditions.
This contrast revealed no significant clusters that were differen-
tially activated by the self- and other-imagery conditions.
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